Smallpox: Federal, State, and Regional Plan by Crouchley, Deborah A.
Smallpox: Federal, State, and Regional Plan 
by 
Deborah A. Crouchley 
March 4, 2003 
A Master's paper submitted to the fuculty of the University ofNorth Carolina at Chapel 
Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree ofMaster ofPublic Health in 
the School of Public Health, Public Health Leadership Program. 
Approved by: 
I 
Abstract 
Since September 11. 2001 there has been an increased threat 
of a chemical or biological attack on America. One of the 
most likely agents to be used in such an attack is smallpox. 
The federal government has developed guidelines to assist 
the state and local governments in rolling out a smallpox 
vaccination plan for their citizens. Each state invited all of 
their local health departments to develop a plan of 
vaccinating healthcare workers against smallpox. Outlined in 
the following sections are those federal, state, and local 
smallpox plans. 
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Concern regarding the use of smallpox as a tool of terrorism has forced the 
federal government to update its recommendations regarding vaccinations for 
health care providers and the general public. The CDC began developing 
guidelines specifically for use in the event of a bioterrorist attack. Each state was 
asked to examine these guidelines and develop their own plans for the distribution 
and voluntary administration of smallpox vaccines. Every local health 
department was involved in the planning. 
The smallpox vaccine dilemma is not just a clinical issue; it is a health 
policy issue. With severely constrained resources, relative cost and potential 
benefits had to be considered. And Americans had to be protected. Those plans 
are summarized below. 
History 
Smallpox (variola) has been one of the most feared diseases for centuries 
because of its ability to spread rapidly and decimate whole populations. Smallpox 
probably was first used as a biological weapon during the French and Indian Wars 
(1754-1767) by British forces in North America (Henderson, et. a!., 1999). 
Soldiers distributed blankets that they had used to wrap smallpox victims to the 
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Indians with the intent of starting outbreaks. More than 50% of many affected 
tribes were killed. The last documented case of smallpox in the United States 
occurred in 1949. Worldwide, the last naturally occurring case was in Somalia in 
1977. A global campaign begun in 1967 by the World Health Organization 
(WHO) succeeded in eradicating smallpox at this time. A committee 
recommended that all laboratories destroy their stocks of variola virus or transfer 
them to one of two reference laboratories- the State Research Center for Virology 
and Biotechnology at Koltsovo, in Siberia, Russia or the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention in Atlanta, Georgia. Recent allegations are that the virus 
stored at the Siberian laboratory might have fallen into non-Russian hands. The 
deliberate reintroduction of smallpox as an epidemic disease would be an 
international crime of unprecedented proportions (Henderson, et. a!., 1999). The 
aerosol infectivity, high mortality, and stability of variola make it a potential 
threat in Biological Warfare and terrorism scenarios (Franz, et. a!., 1997). And 
currently, no one under the age of 30 has been vaccinated against smallpox. In 
1968, the last year for which we have data on mass vaccination, 14.2 million 
persons in the United States were vaccinated. Nine deaths resulted. Applying the 
1968 data to today' s population suggest that there would be 180 deaths from 
vaccination nationwide, which is approximately the number of deaths from traffic 
accidents every 1.5 days (Bicknell, 2002). Presently, only 10% to 15% of the 
U.S. population is thought to be immune to smallpox. 
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Epidemiology L 
Both variola, which causes smallpox, and vaccinia, which causes cowpox, 
are Orthopoxvirus viruses. Though closely related, variola infects humans only, 
whereas vaccinia infects cattle primarily. The smallpox vaccine is made with 
vaccinia virus and does not contain smallpox (Sibley, 2002). The progression of 
the disease can be categorized into 4 distinct periods: incubation, prodrome, 
manifestation, and outcome. During the incubation period, the virus enters the 
respiratory tract, implants itself in the mucosa, and replicates for 3 to 4 days. 
There are generally no symptoms during this period. During the prodromal stage, 
which lasts from 7 to 14 days after the person is exposed, the virus travels to 
regional lymph nodes where it replicates and causes viremia (presence of viruses 
in the blood) followed soon after by a rash. There is sudden onset of fever, 
malaise, headache, vomiting, backache, and abdominal pain. Lesions appear in 
the mouth approximately 24 hours before the skin, and because the oral mucosa 
lacks stratum corneum (outermost horny layer of the epidermis), the lesions easily 
ulcerate and shed live virus in the saliva (Thomas, 1989). This is the time when 
patients become highly infectious (Veenema, 2003). Smallpox is spread from 
person to person, primarily by droplet nuclei or aerosols expelled from the mouth 
and nose of infected persons. It can later be spread by contact with the lesions. 
Humans are infected by direct face-to-face contact with an infected person or via 
fomites (contaminated linens or clothing). The manifestation period lasts from 
day 14 to day 22 of the infection. During this period, the fever may go down. 
The smallpox lesions appear in a centrifugal pattern, beginning on the face and 
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hands, and then moving to the forearms, lower extremities, and finally, the trunk. 
The rash starts off flat but quickly becomes papular or round, and advances to 
pustular. After 8-9 days, it begins to crust over and form scabs. As the patient 
recovers, the scabs fall off, and pitted scarring develops. During the final period, 
the outcome phase, the concern is for secondary bacterial infections which cause 
toxemia. Although these infections are rare, they are the usual cause of death 
during this phase. Patients are considered infectious until all scabs separate and 
should be kept isolated. Hospitalized patients should be kept in a negative 
pressure hospital room. When there are many patients, an isolation hospital or 
other facility should be designated. If a substantial number of patients are 
diagnosed, the surge capacity of the health care system may be surpassed 
(V eenema, 2003). If this happens, because of the possibility of aerosolized 
dissemination of the disease to other hospital patients, it is preferable to arrange 
for isolation in the case patient's own home (Lovinger, 2002). Patients who 
survive develop long-lasting immunity. If the smallpox vaccination is given 
within 1-4 days of exposure to the disease, it may prevent illness, or at least lessen 
the degree of illness associated with the disease. Treatment, once the disease 
symptoms have started, is limited. Sometimes antibiotics are given for secondary 
infections that may occur. Vaccinia immune globulin (VIG) may help shorten the 
disease. According to Inger Damon, MD, PhD, chief of the Poxvirus Section of 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta, "the case 
fatality rate ranges from 10% to 30% in individual outbreaks" of smallpox. 
Secondary bacterial pneumonia is associated with greater that 50% mortality 
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(Franz, et. a!., 1997). In the past, about 1,000 people for every 1 million 
vaccinated for the first time experienced reactions that were serious, but not life 
threatening. Between 14 and 52 people out of 1 million vaccinated for the first 
time experienced potentially life-threatening reactions. From past experience, one 
or two people in 1 million who receive smallpox vaccine may die as a result (U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, 2002). 
Protecting Americans ~--
The September 11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon made starkly clear how vulnerable Americans are to terrorism at home 
(Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute, 2001). Although there is no reason 
to believe that smallpox presents an imminent threat, the attacks of September and 
October 2001 have heightened concern that terrorists may have access to the virus 
and attempt to use it against the American public (U.S. Department of Health and 
l 
Human Services, 2002). In the April 25, 2002, issue of the New England Journal l-
of Medicine, William Bicknell, MD, MPH, professor of international health at 
Boston University's School of Public Health, wrote, "Consider the hypothetical 
case of an attack on numerous cities that puts 50% of the U.S. population at risk. 
If we applied the lowest case fatality rates (3% among persons with partial 
immunity and 5% among nonimmune persons) and also assumed (optimistically) 
that an intensive postvaccination program and good medical care would further 
reduce the rates of transmission and death by 90% to 95%, there could still be 
100,000 to 1 million deaths" (p. 1324). 
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On December 13, 2002, the President announced a plan to better protect 
the American people against the threat of smallpox attack by hostile groups or 
governments. In June 2001, the Advisory Committee on hnmunization Practices 
(ACIP) made recommendations for the use of smallpox vaccine to prepare for a 
possible bioterrorism attack and for response for an attack involving smallpox. 
After 09"11, the CDC asked the AICP to review and update their 
recommendations, and to clarify and expand the primary strategy for control and 
contaimnent of smallpox in the event of an outbreak, although epidemiological 
studies have shown that smallpox has a lower rate of transmission than diseases 
such as measles, pertussis, and influenza (Advisory Committee on hnmunization 
Practices, 2003). The three major proposed strategies for smallpox immunization 
in the face of a bioterrorism threat include (1) mass pre-event vaccination, (2) 
voluntary vaccination and (3) ring vaccination (Baltimore, and McMillan, 2002). 
Each of these approaches has advantages and disadvantages. Mass vaccination 
can effectively prevent the spread of disease, but the disadvantage is that it would 
expose millions of people to the potential risks of vaccinia. Voluntary 
vaccination allows people to make their own choice after being educated to the 
possible risks and benefits of the vaccine, but much of the population is not 
familiar with the complications and would have a difficult time making this 
decision. Ring vaccination (also referred to as search and contaimnent) has been 
used in the past to eradicate smallpox. Actual smallpox cases are isolated and the 
vaccination is given to those who have had face-to-face contact with or those who 
have been in close proximity to the person with the active smallpox. The 
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advantage to this plan is that it allows effective use of the limited number of 
vaccines currently available. It does, however, require preparedness on the part of 
those designated to administer the vaccinations. Meltzer and colleagues 
constructed a mathematical model to describe the spread of smallpox after a 
deliberate release ofthe virus and to predict health outcomes according to three 
interventions: quarantine, vaccination, and a combination of both. They 
recommend a combination of vaccination and quarantine as a strategy to contain 
an outbreak of smallpox (Veenema, 2002). 
The CDC currently recommends voluntary pre-release vaccination of selected 
groups to improve response readiness to smallpox: "Smallpox vaccination is 
recommended for persons pre-designated by the appropriate bioterrorism and 
public health authorities to conduct investigation and follow-up of initial smallpox 
cases that would necessitate direct patient contact" (Charatan, 2002). Pre-
exposure vaccination does not pose the logistic difficulties of vaccination during 
an outbreak and is less expensive. The complexity of administering millions of 
vaccine doses in a crisis is daunting. According to a plan announced by the 
President on December 13,2002, the Department ofHealth and Human Services 
(DHHS) will work with state and local goverrunents to form volunteer Smallpox 
Response Teams who can provide critical services to their fellow Americans in 
the event of a smallpox attack. The President also announced that the Department 
of Defense (DOD) would vaccinate certain military and civilian personnel who 
are or may be deployed in high threat areas. Some United States personnel 
assigned to certain overseas embassies will also be offered vaccination. Although 
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the vaccine is effective if administered shortly after exposure, it may not be 
feasible during an emergency to vaccinate overseas troops and civilian personnel. 
Pre-attack vaccination is therefore warranted. The federal government is not 
recommending that members of the general public be vaccinated at this point. 
DHHS is in the process of establishing an orderly process to make unlicensed 
vaccine available to those adult members of the general public without medical 
contraindications who insist on being vaccinated either in 2003, with an 
unlicensed vaccine, or in 2004, with a licensed vaccine (U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, 2002). A number of factors were used in developing 
these recommendations. Information provided by the government indicated that 
there is a real risk for smallpox occurring as a result of a deliberated release by 
terrorists, but this risk is low. There is also an assumption that appropriate 
screening for contraindications to vaccination will be implemented, and that there 
will be sufficient supply of both vaccinia and vaccinia immune globulin available 
for use. State Health Departments are developing plans for vaccination of 
smallpox to public health and health care teams and will be responsible for 
making vaccine requests to CDC to support the vaccination of these teams. The 
CDC in cooperation with the National Vaccination Advisory Committee, the 
Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee, and the Advisory 
Committee on hnmunization Practices has issued the following considerations for 
hospitals in order to meet the goal of providing uninterrupted medical care for 
smallpox patients in acute care hospitals caring for both smallpox patients and 
patients without smallpox: 
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• Vaccinated teams ofhealthcare workers who will be protected and feel 
comfortable managing smallpox patients in the Emergency Department 
and providing direct medical care for the first patients with 
suspected/confirmed smallpox admitted to an acute care hospital 
The underlying principle here is that only immune healthcare workers should care 
for patients with vaccine-preventable diseases. 
• Protection provided to susceptible healthcare workers by protective 
equipment (e.g. respirators, gowns, gloves) could be overwhelmed by 
large inoculum or misuse of equipment. 'Information provided by 
Department of Defense'. 
• Unvaccinated non-essential personnel are restricted from entering areas 
with smallpox patients. 
The requirements of these smallpox response teams are that participation is 
voluntary and that the vaccination is required for all team members (Section 304 
of the Homeland Security Act protects institutions against liability in vaccination 
programs) (CDC Video, 2002). Preference is given to revaccinees to decrease the 
incidence and severity of systemic effects. The CDC, in cooperation with the 
ACIP, advises that there be enough healthcare workers on the team to provide for 
the delivery of care 24 hours a day/ 7 days a week for 7-1 0 days. The categories 
and numbers ofhealthcare workers per hospital would depend on: 
• Patient population 
• Type of medical care delivered 
• W ark schedules and vacations 
12 L 
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The suggested composition of these healthcare response teams includes: r 
• Emergency department staff- Registered Nurses, Medical Doctors, 
Emergency Medical Technicians 
• Intensive care staff- selected RNs and MDs 
• Pediatric trained staff 
• General Medical or Surgical Units- (defined as those with negative 
pressure rooms) selected RNs, MDs, hospitalists (general practice 
physicians who are employed by the hospital to care for patients who do 
not have a private physician), obstetricians, and pediatricians 
• House staff- selected MDs 
• Specialists 
0 Infectious disease 
0 Surgeons 
0 Anesthesiologists 
0 Dermatologists 
0 Ophthalmologists 
0 Pathologists 
• Respiratory therapists 
• Infection control staff 
• Radiology technicians 
• Security 
• Housekeepers 
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Once the vaccination has been administered to members of the team, strict r 
adherence to the infection control guidelines for site care must be followed. 
These recommendations include: 
• a semi-permeable dressing covering the vaccination site 
• keep site covered until scab separates (approximately 21 days) 
• long-sleeved clothing must be worn at work 
• when showering, cover the site with plastic wrap 
• after showering, dry the vaccination site last 
• careful hand washing with antimicrobial soap 
• wash linens separately with hot water 
• change dressing every 3-5 days 
• change gloves between removal of old dressing and application of new 
dressing 
• discard dressing in biohazard bag at hospital or tied plastic bag at horne 
The CDC is recommending that each hospital develop a site maintenance 
monitoring program to ensure that all vaccination sites are inspected daily. The 
additional benefits of this type of monitoring are that it allows trained personnel 
to observe each person for side effects of the vaccination and encourages 
reinforcement of education regarding the vaccine. The CDC further recommends 
that hospitals stagger the vaccination by 3 weeks within a clinical area to 
guarantee adequate staff coverage in the event that some staff members suffer 
side effects from the vaccination. 
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Following a confirmed smallpox outbreak within the United States, rapid L 
voluntary vaccination of a large population may be required to 1) supplement 
priority surveillance and containment control strategies in areas with smallpox 
cases, 2) reduce the "at-risk" population for additional intentional releases of 
smallpox virus if the probability of such occurrences is considered significant, or 
3) address heightened public or political concerns regarding access to voluntary 
vaccination. Large-scale voluntary smallpox vaccination would be considered 
part of an overall national vaccination strategy and would be initiated following ~-
the approval of the Secretary of Health and Human Services. The following 
considerations apply: 
1. Current smallpox vaccines are available under an Investigational New 
Drug (IND) protocol only. Informed consent must be obtained. 
2. The shortened IND process for obtaining informed consent should be 
followed. 
3. Separate clinics should be considered for vaccination and counseling of 
identified contacts of smallpox cases, but resources must also be available 
at voluntary clinics as some contacts may show up for vaccination at 
those facilities. 
4. Medical screening for contraindications must be done and vaccination 
should generally not be recommended for persons with contraindications 
who are not otherwise identified as contacts. 
5. Appropriate amounts of vaccinia immune globulin (VIG) should be 
available within the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile (NPS) to treat 
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anticipated adverse events prior to initiating large-scale voluntary 
vaccination as a component of the national response to a smallpox 
outbreak. 
6. Treatment of adverse events will occur in facilities separate from 
vaccination clinics. 
7. Existing immunization program resources should be utilized in the 
implementation of voluntary vaccination programs and coordination 
should occur between state and local immunization program and 
bioterrorism planning personnel. 
8. Pre-designated sites or clinics will be established, as part of the 
community smallpox response plan, for the evaluation of symptomatic 
individuals to rule out smallpox. 
9. The pre-designated sites for evaluating symptomatic individuals for 
smallpox will be identified in public service announcements and these 
individuals will be discouraged from presenting to voluntary vaccination 
clinics. 
10. Vaccine clinic and transportation personnel should be vaccinated prior to 
beginning vaccination clinic activities in order to provide protection 
against exposure from symptomatic contacts that may inadvertently 
present to the vaccination clinic. 
11. The recommended guidelines for the logistics, design, and 
implementation of a voluntary vaccination clinic are interim and are 
meant to support existing emergency vaccination clinic plans that state or 
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local public health authorities have developed (CDC Smallpox Clinical 
Guide, 2002). 
The federal govermnent will provide many of the necessary resources to state and 
local public health authorities for use in voluntary vaccination programs if a 
smallpox outbreak has been confirmed. These resources include the smallpox 
vaccines and the supplies needed to administer the vaccine i.e. diluents for 
reconstitution of the powder form of the vaccine, bifurcated needles, and 
directions for vaccine administration. Also included in these resources are the 
consent forms for vaccination, information sheets on the smallpox vaccine, 
adverse events, and contraindications, vaccine site care instructions, and contact 
information. VIG for the treatment of serious adverse events that may be 
expected as well as technical assistance for setting up the clinics is also provided. 
Current plans for rapid, large-scale shipment of vaccine through the NPS system 
allows for shipment of up to 500 V axicool (self-contained shipping and storage 
units for the vaccine) systems on day 1 (7 5 million total vaccine doses), with up 
to 615 additional vaccine shipments/day in Styrofoam shipping containers from 
day 2-6. This plan provides for distribution of280 million doses of smallpox 
vaccine from NPS storage sites to states' field sites within 5-7 days (CDC 
Smallpox Clinical Guide, 2002). Security needs should be assessed during 
planning of vaccination sites. Security should be provided to vaccine storage 
sites. Backup power sources should be identified for storage sites. Security 
should be provided for crowd control, traffic, and personnel safety. If the 
vaccine is to be transported, security should be provided. According to the 
17 
guidelines, each vaccination clinic site should be able to administer as many as L 
I 00,000 vaccinations per day or 1 million persons over 10 days. The CDC guide 
suggests the number of personnel needed to staff a clinic of this size, and breaks 
the personnel down into specific positions to enhance the flow of patients and 
expedite the vaccination process. Of course, the numbers that are suggested by 
the CDC would be based on the size of the communities being vaccinated and the 
total population of those communities. There are suggestions from the federal 
government on how to present consistent information to the public. And finally, 
the CDC provides suggestions regarding additional supplies and equipment that 
must be considered for each site. These need to be provided by that individual 
location. 
In January of2003, the CDC began shipping smallpox vaccine to state and 
local governments that will coordinate the smallpox response teams. "At this 
time, our highest priority is to vaccinate members of smallpox response teams in 
the states," said Dr. Julie Gerberding, director, CDC (CDC, 2003). According to 
the Smallpox Vaccination Report from the CDC dated February 11,2003, a total 
of only 19 states had participated in the voluntary pre-event vaccination program 
and only 1,043 people had received the smallpox vaccination since the program 
began. In January 2003, Barbara Blakeney, President of the American Nurses 
Association issued a statement that said most nurses support the federal 
government's plan to vaccinate health care workers but that most nurses lack 
critical knowledge about the vaccine. Louis Z. Cooper, MD, interim director of 
the National Network for Immunization Information (NNII) agrees, "If nurses 
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don't understand how the smallpox vaccine works, we can be confident that the 
general public doesn't either"(National Network for Immunization Information, 
2003). A nationwide survey of state health officials by The New York Times 
found about 350 hospitals that declined to participate in the vaccination of 
healthcare workers. The argument is that the chance of a smallpox outbreak is 
too small to warrant the risks associated with receiving the vaccine. Other 
concerns ofliability and personal safety exist. As this initiative moves forward, 
health officials are racing to resolve legal, medical, financial and logistical 
"----
questions regarding the vaccination. The administration and Congress have 
provided liability protections for makers of the vaccine as well as hospitals and 
medical personnel administering it. But federal officials have consistently 
rejected entreaties to compensate people harmed by the vaccine (Union Calls for 
Changes, 2003). Dr. Gerberding was non-committal on the issue of 
compensation for negative outcomes from the vaccine, but states that "a number 
of steps are being taken"(U.S. Spurns Smallpox Vaccine, 2003). 
North Carolina's Smallpox Vaccination Plan 
[Preface: The North Carolina Smallpox Vaccination Plan (NCSVP) is a 
confidential document containing specific details of a public security plan and is 
therefore exempt from the NC public records law according to G.S. 132-1.7. The 
Executive Summary and Press Release contain non-classified information 
regarding the NCSVP and are considered public documents} 
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The plan provides a blueprint for how the state will carry out three L 
smallpox vaccination scenarios- pre-event vaccinations, ring vaccinations 
associated with a confirmed case of smallpox, and mass vaccinations- as defined 
by the CDC. 
The NC Smallpox Preparedness and Response Plan is divided into 5 
phases: 
• Phase I- Baseline 
• Phase II- Heightened Threat 
• Phase III- Post-event, limited outbreak 
• Phase IV- Post-event, large outbreak 
• Phase V- Recovery 
The components of each phase consist of: surveillance, vaccination, outbreak 
investigation, quarantine and isolation, mass care, mass fatality, public 
information, and command/control/communications. The state plan makes certain 
assumptions: 
• Liability and indemnification of state and local vaccine providers will be 
resolved at the federal level 
• CDC will provide vaccine, diluent, and needles for each vaccination stage 
• State and local government will provide all other vaccination supplies 
• NC will use CDC forms 
• Counties may request assistance through multi-county assistance compacts 
• In large-scale vaccination, federal government will provide additional 
resources: National Pharmaceutical Stockpile (NPS) (the first wave of 
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supplies provided by the federal government during a mass casualty L 
event), Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) (the second wave of supplies 
provided by the federal government during a mass casualty event), and 
National Disaster Medical Service (NDMS). 
• One-fourth to one-half of those offered pre-event vaccination will decline 
• Patient care personnel that decline vaccination will be required to sign an 
indenmification and liability release form to continue to work in patient 
care positions 
• Costs to travel to vaccination sites, hours and/or salary lost are the 
responsibility ofthe vaccinees or their employers 
• Costs of adverse vaccine reactions are covered under employment policies 
and workers compensation laws 
• Local Public Health Directors have primary responsibility for requesting 
smallpox vaccine and vaccination resources and for ensuring vaccinations 
within their respective counties L & 
• Vaccinations will be provided on a voluntary basis only 
• Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices guidelines will be 
followed 
• Adequate amounts ofVIG will be made available 
• CDC personnel/specialists will be available to NC as needed and 
requested 
• The State Epidemiologist, Public Health Preparedness and Response 
Bioterrorism Coordinator, Public Health Regional Surveillance Team 
21 
physician or Local Health Department Medical Director will provide 
standing orders for all vaccination scenarios, as necessary 
According to Dr. Jim Kirkpatrick, head of the Office of Public Health 
Preparedness and Response, "Pre-event vaccinations will have two or three 
stages, depending upon the CDC's final recommendation" (North Carolina 
L 
Department of Health and Human Services (NC DHHS), 2002). The first stage 
will begin within 30 days of the president's announcement to proceed and will 
focus on the vaccination of identified key personnel in the public health, hospital, 
and emergency response fields. It is very important that these people be pre-
vaccinated so that they will be able to respond to an outbreak without fear of 
contracting the disease when they encounter it (North Carolina Department of 
Health and Human Services (NC DHHS), 2002). The second stage of 
vaccinations will capture the broader health and emergency responder 
populations, including law enforcement, emergency medical services, firemen, 
and Hazardous Materials (HAZMA T) teams. Ifthere is enough available vaccine, 
everyone who falls into the first two stages will be vaccinated within six months 
of the federal order to vaccinate. Vaccination of the general public would be 
considered phase three of the pre-event measures and would probably begin in 
2004 (NC Dept. ofHHS, 2002). The state plan for vaccinating the general public 
is the same regardless of whether this is a preventative measure or a response to 
an outbreak. The plan for all three scenarios involves identification of all 
vaccinees, coordination among local health departments for vaccination dates, and 
deciding on vaccination locations. The state plan outlines exactly who needs to 
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receive the vaccination first and when this process will begin. This plan follows 
ACIP recommendations (as outlined above) for which healthcare workers need to 
receive the pre-event vaccine and how to respond when cases of smallpox or 
contacts of cases are identified in North Carolina. 
Those who would be advised not to be vaccinated include people with the 
following conditions and those who live with someone who have such a 
condition: 
• Expectant mothers 
• People with eczema or atopic dermatitis 
• People being treated for cancer 
• People who are HIV-positive 
• People who have had an organ transplant 
• People who are allergic to the vaccine or any of its ingredients 
• People who have a moderate or severe short-term illness 
• Anyone who is less than 18 years of age 
The CDC and the State Health Director emphasize that, given the high mortality 
rate associated with smallpox, people who have actually been exposed to the virus 
should receive the vaccine regardless of their health condition (North Carolina 
Department of Health and Human Services (NC DHHS), 2002). 
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New Hanover County's Smallpox Plan 
North Carolina submitted its smallpox plan to the CDC on November 27, 
2002, as requested by the federal govermnent. That plan was approved on January 
15, 2003. Since that time, New Hanover Health Network (NHHN) has been 
working closely with the N.C. Hospital Association and the New Hanover County 
Health Department to fully anticipate what may be expected of them. "If the 
smallpox threat becomes reality, NHHN will take a leadership role in advancing a 
regional response plan as well, to ensure hospitals in the Coastal Carolinas Health 
Alliance and around this region are able to effectively care for their 
communities"( Atkinson, 2003). New Hanover Health Network had developed a 
Bioterrorism Response Plan that includes the response to a smallpox outbreak. It 
designates who will care for the patient( s ), where they will be cared for (and this 
will depend on how many confirmed cases the hospital is treating), what 
protective equipment will be used, and how to handle issues such as transporting 
patients within the hospital and how to handle the lab specimens from and 
equipment used to treat these patients. Home care instructions are part of the 
strategic plan, in the event that there are too many people requiring hospitalization 
within a short period of time. Ifthe hospitals become overcrowded, it may 
become necessary for sick people to be cared for in their home by relatives or 
friends. The local plan includes a fact sheet with information that may be helpful 
to the caregivers. The plan also includes how to handle deceased patients. The 
hospital plan includes all of the forms recommended by the CDC for use during 
an outbreak. These include vaccination consent forms, screening forms, fact 
24 
sheets providing information on smallpox, as well as educational information on L 
how to care for the vaccination site once the vaccine has been administered. This 
smallpox response plan closely follows the recommendations of the federal 
government for reducing the risk of transmission of a highly contagious virus. 
Isolation of these patients will be maintained until the local health department 
declares that smallpox is no longer a threat to health care workers or the public 
(NHRMC Bioterrorism Plan, 2001). 
In addition to this smallpox plan, New Hanover Regional Medical Center 
has stored enough medical supplies to treat up to 500 victims should a mass 
casualty event occur in our county or any of the surrounding counties. These 
supplies can be easily mobilized to any area in need. The supplies are color-
coded for easy distribution and utilization during such an event. 
Summary 
The specter of resurgent smallpox is ominous, especially given the 
enormous efforts that have been made to eradicate what has been characterized as 
the most devastating of all the pestilential diseases. Unfortunately, the threat of 
an aerosol release of smallpox is real and the potential for a catastrophic scenario 
is great unless effective control measures can quickly be implemented 
(Henderson, et. a!., 1999). Much work has been done at the federal level to 
develop guidelines for state and local governments to follow. Collaboration 
between agencies such as the Centers for Disease Control, the Advisory 
Committee on hnmunization Practices, the Center for Civilian Biodefense 
25 
Studies, the Department of Defense, the Department of Health and Human L 
Services, and various Schools of Public Health has been successful in researching 
an all-but-forgotten disease, updating existing smallpox information, and revising 
old smallpox plans. Their efforts have set the groundwork for every state in our 
nation to move forward with their individual responsibilities- to prepare for a 
potential outbreak, to educate the public about smallpox, to allay fears and 
concerns, to reassure healthcare workers who will serve on the front lines ifthis 
threat becomes a reality. State Health Departments have stepped up to the plate L_ 
and submitted their action plans to the federal government for approval. Local 
health facilities, such as New Hanover Regional Medical Center, have also 
developed plans, keeping the safety oftheir employees and the community 
foremost in those plans. Every possible scenario is being considered. Every 
possible precaution is being taken to keep Americans safe. Even though 
bioterrorists will face difficulties in carrying out a biological attack against 
America, it is well within their grasp to do so. And as the terrible events of 
September 11 demonstrate, the United States is far from invulnerable to those 
who wish it harm. The Administration and Congress are wise to conduct a war on 
terrorism while pursuing a homeland defense strategy that will reduce the risk of 
bioterrorism and limit the devastation should an attack occur (Kathryn and Shelby 
Cullom Davis Institute, 2001). 
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